Regulatory or regulating publics?:The European union's regulation of emerging health technologies and citizen participation by Flear, Mark L & Pickersgill, Martyn D
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory or regulating publics?
Citation for published version:
Flear, ML & Pickersgill, MD 2013, 'Regulatory or regulating publics?: The European union's regulation of
emerging health technologies and citizen participation' Medical Law Review, vol 21, no. 1, pp. 39-70. DOI:
10.1093/medlaw/fws039
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1093/medlaw/fws039
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Medical Law Review
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), which permits non-commercial reuse, distribution, and
reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
REGULATORY OR REGULATING
PUBLICS? THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
REGULATION OF EMERGING
HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES AND
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
MARK L. FLEAR1∗ AND MARTYN D. PICKERSGILL2∗
1Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast, 28 University
Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK and Member of the NI DNA Database
Governance Board
m.flear@qub.ac.uk
2Wellcome Trust Senior Research Fellow in Biomedical Ethics, Centre for
Population Health Sciences, University of Edinburgh Medical School, Medical
School, Teviot Place, Edinburgh EH8 9AG, UK
martyn.pickersgill@ed.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
‘Citizen participation’ includes various participatory techniques and is
frequently viewed as an unproblematic and important social good
when used as part of the regulation of the innovation and implementation
of science and technology. This is perhaps especially evident in debates
around ‘anticipatory governance’ or ‘upstream engagement’. Here, we in-
terrogate this thesis using the example of the European Union’s regulation
of emerging health technologies (such as nanotechnology). In this case,
citizen participation in regulatory debate is concerned with innovative
objects for medical application that are considered to be emergent or
not yet concrete. Through synthesising insights from law, regulatory
studies, critical theory, and science and technology studies, we seek to
cast new light on the promises, paradoxes, and pitfalls of citizen partici-
pation as a tool or technology of regulation in itself. As such we aim to
generate a new vantage point from which to view the values and
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sociotechnical imaginaries that are both ‘designed-in’ and ‘designed-out’
of citizen participation. In so doing, we show not only how publics (do
not) regulate technologies, but also how citizens themselves are regulated
through the techniques of participation.
Keywords: Participation, Law, Regulation, Science, Technology
I. INTRODUCTION
The place, role, and impact of individuals and communities—together,
‘the public’—within science, technology, and engineering has, it seems,
never before been more obvious, or contested.1 Citizen or public partici-
pation2 is a tool of governance which includes various techniques aimed
at incorporating the perspectives of publics within science policy and
regulation,3 and/or to inform processes of innovation. Many view par-
ticipation as an unproblematic and important social good when used
as part of the regulation of the innovation and implementation of
science and technology. Think-tanks like Demos, for instance, have
done much to stimulate and promote debates around anticipatory gov-
ernance and, relatedly, upstream engagement.4 Yet, other commentators
have been more critical of such ventures. In particular, some scientists
(and bioethicists) have been resistant to the ‘democratisation’ of policy
and research, and a number of social scientists have been vocal in
their critiques of the scope and limits of participatory techniques.5
1 Eg Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, Nanoscience and
Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties (Royal Society, London
2004), Ch 7 ‘Stakeholder and Public Dialogue’.
2 Like many of the actors and institutions involved, we use these terms inter-
changeably. For more detail on forms of participation and engagement, and
its relation to scientific governance, see: A Irwin, ‘The Politics of Talk:
Coming to Terms with the ‘New’ Scientific Governance’ (2006) 36 Social
Studies of Science 299.
3 Black’s definition of regulation is ‘the intentional use of authority to affect be-
haviour of a different party according to set standards, involving instruments
of information-gathering and behaviour modification’ (J Black, ‘Critical
Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy
1). This understanding of regulation includes technologies as well as ‘hard
law’, ‘soft law’, social norms, and the market. See further: R Baldwin, M
Cave, and M Lodge, ‘Regulation, the Field and the Developing Agenda’ in
R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook on Regulation
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011).
4 Eg J Wilsdon and R Willis, See-Through Science: Why Public Engagement
Needs to Move Upstream (Demos, London 2004).
5 As we will discuss later in the article, though see: J Schummer ‘Identifying
Ethical Issues in Nanotechnologies’ in H ten Have (ed), Nanotechnologies,
Ethics and Politics (UNESCO, Paris 2007), 81, cited in R Brownsword,
Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2008), 121, and with further discussion of definition and
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In this article, we consider these issues from a somewhat different (but
nevertheless related) vantage point. Drawing on insights from law, regu-
latory studies, critical theory, and science and technology studies (STS),
we explore the ways in which participatory techniques can be under-
stood as technologies themselves (an understanding that brings attention
to the techniques and practices that enable symbolic or material
change).6 Specifically, we draw attention to how attempts to regulate
in the face of uncertain scientific knowledge provide the conditions
of possibility for participation. As such, we query the function of
participation—what does the technology do?—as well as the norms,
values, perspectives, and ultimately, the actual and imagined users
that are ‘built into’ and privileged by it. In other words, we are interested
both in how publics7 regulate technologies, and how citizens themselves
are regulated through technologies of participation.8
Our case study for this analysis is the European Union’s (EU’s) regu-
lation of emerging health technologies, especially nanotechnology (i.e.
its nanoregulation).9 One, narrow, definition of nanotechnology is
spheres of application, 120–2; J Tait ‘Upstream Engagement and the Govern-
ance of Science’ (2009) 10 EMBO Reports S18–22.
6 For a discussion of ‘technology’ understood in a broad sense, see M Pickersgill,
‘Sociotechnical Innovation in Mental Health: Articulating Complexity’ in ML
Flear and others (eds), European Law and New Health Technologies (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2013 (Forthcoming)).
7 By ‘publics’, we mean all individuals who are not formal policy actors in the
regulation of health technologies, nor scientists/engineers involved in the pro-
cesses of innovation being regulated. We refer to ‘publics’, in the plural, rather
than ‘the public’, in the singular, in order to underscore the plurality of cul-
tures within and between countries. See: H Dietrich and R Schibeci,
‘Beyond Public Perceptions of Gene Technology: Community Participation
in Public Policy in Australia’ (2003) 12 Public Understanding of Science 381.
8 Cf ML Flear, ‘The EU’s Biopolitical Governance of Advanced Therapy
Medicinal Products’ (2009) 16 (1) Maastricht Journal of European and Com-
parative Law 113. See further: ML Flear and S Ramshaw (eds), Symposium:
New Technologies, European Law and Citizens (Special Issue) (2009) 16
(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law.
9 For discussion of this emerging area, see: B Dorbeck-Jung, DM Bowman, and
G Van Calster (eds), Governing Nanomedicine: Lessons from Within, and
For, the EU Medical Technology Regulatory Framework (Special Issue)
(2011) 33(2) Law and Policy (especially: C Altenstetter, ‘Medical Device
Regulation and Nanotechnologies: Determining the Role of Patient Safety
Concerns in Policymaking’ (2011) 33(2) Law and Policy 227; B Dorbeck-Jung
and N Chowdhury, ‘Is the European Medical Products Authorisation Regula-
tion Equipped to Cope with the Challenges of Nanomedicines?’ (2011) 33 (2)
Law and Policy 276); B Dorbeck-Jung, ‘The Governance of Therapeutic
Nanoproducts in the European Union—A Model for New Health Technology
Regulation?’ in ML Flear and others (eds), European Law and New Health
Technologies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013 (Forthcoming)); J
D’Silva and DM Bowman, The Legal Regulation of Nanotechnologies
(Special Issue) (2011) 2(3) European Journal of Law and Technology.
,http://ejlt.org/.; M Lee, ‘Risk and Beyond: EU Regulation of
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‘the investigation and manipulation of material objects in the 1–100
nanometer range so as to explore novel properties and develop new
devices and functionalities that essentially depend on the 1–100 nano-
meter range’.10 These potentially transformative capabilities are now
being applied in a wide range of contexts, including energy, the environ-
ment, information, and communication technology, and in the medical
sphere. In relation to the latter, the European Medicines Agency, for in-
stance, defines nanomedicine as ‘the application of nanotechnology in
view of making a medical diagnosis or treating or preventing diseases.
It exploits the improved and often novel physical, chemical and biologic-
al properties of materials at nanometre scale’.11
Nano-enabled medical technologies that are emergent or not yet con-
crete are highlighted in parts of our discussion because they tend to be
stressed in EU nanoregulation as an example of a notable field of appli-
cation. The most likely reason for this is the quotidian use and (revolu-
tionary) potential of nanotechnology in the medical context (highly
pertinent to individuals and governments, perhaps especially in post-
industrial democratic societies). As such, nanomedicine comprises
highly resonant innovative objects (i.e. tools or techniques that can be
regarded as novel) and practices (i.e. new scientific disciplines or re-
search agendas) in the public imagination.12 This makes nanomedicine
a particularly useful example to pique citizen interest in and engagement
with regulatory decision-making. Forging regulation for nanoscience
and technology has been undermined by the ambiguity of research
and development in this area. That is, the inherent scientific uncertainty
about the degree and types of risks nanotechnologies pose, such as to
vulnerable recipients/patients, as well as their potential, thwarts exclu-
sive reliance on risk-based regulation that often aims to produce legitim-
ate decisions by using science and focusing on the consequences for
safety. This has produced a turn towards exercises in participation
Nanotechnology’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 799; JV McHale, ‘Nano-
medicine and the EU: Some Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Challenges’ (2009)
16 (1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 65.
10 Schummer, above, n 5, 81. For further discussion of definition and spheres of
application, see: Brownsword, above, n 5, 120–2.
11 European Medicines Agency, ‘Nanotechnology-based Medicinal Products for
Human Use’ Reflection Paper EMA/CHMP/79769/2006 (EMA, London 2006).
Available at: ,http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_
library/Regulatory_and_procedural_guideline/2010/01/WC500069728.pdf.
(last accessed 2 May 2012). See further: European Commission, Towards a
European Strategy for Nanotechnology, COM(2004) 338 final, 4; European
Technology Platform, Nanomedicine: Nanotechnology for Health (November
2006); European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE),
Opinion on the Ethical Aspects of Nanomedicine (Opinion No 21), 17
January 2007, para 2.2.
12 For discussion, see: Dorbeck-Jung, ‘Therapeutic Nanoproducts’ above, n 9.
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that seek to contribute towards regulation through the production of
(procedurally if not substantively) legitimate decisions.
We do not attend further to the differences between nanotechnology
and nanomedicine, in terms of the nature of the risk and uncertainty
about their respective uses, nordowe examine the differences in their regu-
lation. Instead, we focus on participation in the regulation of nanoscience
and technology in general.Our reason is simple: as we go on to trace, it is at
this broad level that the EU is currently involved, even as medical applica-
tions are stressed in the pertinent discourses. Nevertheless, participation in
the EU’s nanoregulation and its more general techno-regulation remain
underexplored. This lack of attention is especially striking given the
EU’s increasingly active regulation of emerging and new health technolo-
gies, and its growing interest in fostering and governing innovation—
including the science of nanotechnology (nanoscience), in the general
field of health.13 A focus on participation is especially timely given that
the gathering pace of EU nanoregulation means participatory techniques
are likely to be developed in the near future.14
Our paper, then, aims to underscore the extent to which, in general,
public participation in the EU has been used more to legitimate regulation
than to ensure the substantive involvement of citizens in the regulation of
science and technology. In essence, participation is a technology to build
trust and promote consumption in the marketplace, rather than regulate in-
novation. Indeed, and as we will later explore, we might speculate as to
whether the design of participation—by privileging some kinds of expertise
and voices over others—actually decreases the impact of citizens on regu-
lation. Furthermore, it is possible that the design of participatory techni-
ques and processes help to produce a mandate for innovation, by
leveraging scientific uncertainty to impel innovation which will then
reduce this. In this way, we can advance—and proffer some answers
to—the question of whether citizens involved in EU participatory exercises
are ‘regulatory publics’ (i.e. publics who can and do impact upon the regu-
lation of science and technology), or whether they are themselves regulated.
Our analytic perspective is built through a variety of literatures, par-
ticularly within law, regulatory studies, and STS; accordingly, a broader
aim for this article is to contribute to the developing dialogue between
law and STS.15 Such scholarship seeks to frustrate the demarcations
13 ML Flear, A-M Farrell, TK Hervey, and T Murphy (eds), European Law and
New Health Technologies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013
(Forthcoming)).
14 Dorbeck-Jung, ‘Therapeutic Nanoproducts’ above, n 9.
15 See: J Abraham and H Lawton-Smith (eds), Regulation of the Pharmaceutical
Industry (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2003); J Aronson, Genetic Witness: Science,
Law, and Controversy in the Making of DNA Profiling (Rutgers University
Press, Piscataway 2007); E Cloatre and MD Pickersgill (eds), Technoscience,
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that may be made between law and science; these divisions serve to deny
the normative content of technology and scientific knowledge, and po-
tentially shield innovation from engagement by law.16 We regard it as
crucial that these insights be developed and circulated, given the
common and potentially dangerous idea that law is unable to ‘keep up’
with technology—the so-called problem of ‘pace’ highlighted by Brown-
sword17—and which links to the potential for the ‘rule of technology’ as a
means of regulating behaviour and social outcomes through design.18
In meeting our aims, in the next section we engage with and synthesise
some key insights from law, regulatory studies, critical theory, and STS.
In so doing, we hope to animate fresh debate about the scope, limits, and
future of public participation at the level of the EU, while also providing
a conceptual resource through which positions can be articulated.19
From there, we go on to consider innovation and participation in the
EU: what does this look like in general, and how does this play out
for nanotechnology specifically? This sets the scene for a more
in-depth analysis of public participation in nanotechnology; here, we
examine the role played by future uses of nanotechnology, discourses
of risk and uncertainty, and practices of ‘educating’ citizens, in ordering
and constituting the machinery of participatory technologies—and thus
how they regulate publics and science.
Law and Society: Interrogating the Nexus (Routledge, London 2013 (Forth-
coming)); A Daemmrich, Pharmacopolitics: Drug Regulation in the United
States and Germany (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill
2006); R Hindmarsh and B Prainsack (eds), Genetic Subjects: Global Gov-
ernance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2010); S Jasanoff (ed), Reframing Rights: Bioconstitution-
alism in the Genetic Age (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2011); B Latour, The
Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat (Polity, Cambridge
2009); C Lawless and A Faulkner (eds), Material Worlds: Intersections of
Law, Science, Technology and Society (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2012); M
Lynch, SA Cole, and R McNally, Truth Machine: The Contentious History
of DNA Fingerprinting (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2008);
S Parthasarathy, Building Genetic Medicine: Breast Cancer, Technology,
and the Comparative Politics of Health Care (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
2007); A Pottage and B Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of
Modern Patent Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010).
16 For discussion, see: T Murphy and N Whitty, ‘Risk and Human Rights in UK
Prison Governance’ (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 798.
17 See further: R Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflec-
tions on Regulating Technologies’ in R Brownsword and K Yeung (eds),
Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Techno-
logical Fixes (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008).
18 L Lessig, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York
1999); R Brownsword, ‘Code, Control and Choice: Why East is East and
West is West’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 1; Brownsword, above, n 5.
19 Cf P McNaghton, M Kearnes, and BE Wynne, ‘Nanotechnology, Govern-
ance and Public Deliberation: What Role for the Social Sciences?’ (2005)
27 Science Communication 268.
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II. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
The perceived risk of new scientific and technological developments is a
central concern especially in relation to the EU, which has met with a
crisis of public confidence and legitimacy20 in the wake of high-profile
regulatory failures such as the BSE21 crisis of the 1990s. One corollary
of this has been a proliferation of debate in regards to what regulation in
cases of scientific risk and uncertainty should look like, and how it
should be implemented.22 Law and regulatory studies, with their focus
on decision-making, are, of course, central to this debate, especially
given renewed attention to the salience of the context of scientific uncer-
tainty. This is highlighted in the influential academic analysis provided
by Brownsword, who has argued that regulators ‘need to tailor their inter-
ventions to the perceived risk profile presented by a particular technol-
ogy’.23 This involves determining such matters as when risk materialises
(whether it is when the technology goes wrong or is abused—or
works!); the degree of risk (low or high); the kind of harms or hazards
to which risk pertains (physical, environmental, social, economic, moral,
and political) and the potential for their ranking; and, finally, how risk
relates to precaution (whether precaution occurs at risk assessment or
somehow operates in risk management).24 In short, the destabilised scien-
tific foundations of decision-making around emerging technologies like
nanotechnology present a problem for the production of a risk profile in
that so much is unknown and uncertain, and there is little agreement on
a range of issues—including how risks ‘should be framed, which method-
ologies should be adopted, [and] which values prioritized’.25
Moreover, and as a crucial link to participation, with risk-based
approaches undermined but nevertheless still central to the regulation
of emergent technologies, such as nanotechnology, ‘the legitimacy
crisis becomes acute’.26 In such cases, public participation is seen as a
key way of achieving accountability and legitimacy.27 Indeed,
20 For an overview, see: C Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000)
27 Journal of Law and Society 38; F Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective
and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999); A Arnull and D
Wincott, Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2002).
21 That is, bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
22 For discussion, see: M Everson and E Vos, ‘The Scientification of Politics and
the Politicisation of Science’ in M Everson and E Vos (eds), Uncertain Risks
Regulated (Routledge-Cavendish, Oxon 2009).
23 Brownsword, above, n 5, 118.
24 Ibid, 118–9.
25 Ibid, 119–20.
26 Ibid, 131.
27 On the necessity of public engagement, see: DJ Fiorini, ‘Citizen Participation
and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms’ (1990) 15
Science, Technology & Human Values 226.
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participation is noted as best occurring from the beginning of techno-
logical development. For Mandel, participation at an early stage in in-
novation when there is ‘a high degree of uncertainty and a low degree
of attachment to the status quo, can present a unique opportunity to
bring together diverse stakeholders to produce a collaborative govern-
ance system rather than a resource-draining adversarial battle’.28
Nevertheless, irrespective of the precise rationalities29 for participa-
tion, including the quelling of contestation through prefiguring what
is ‘at stake’ in discussions, or some sort of input of knowledge and per-
spectives, early engagement is held to produce smarter regulation.30
Consequently, there is concern for, as Brownsword puts it, the
‘general features to be designed in[to]’31 participation. Importantly,
in the context of the ‘bioethical triangle’ underpinning regulation—
an empowering human rights perspective, a largely restrictive and
disempowering dignitarian perspective, and a pragmatic utilitarian
perspective32—there is little possibility of substantive agreement, and
even proceduralism can reach its limits.
Yet, there is a need to go further here by looking beyond formal proce-
duralism to explore how regulation in the context of uncertain scientific
knowledge provides the conditions of possibility for, and impacts on the
design of, participation. That said, public participation in risk regulation
is thus not only an important means of steering EU activities and providing
a framework for negotiating and governing uncertainty. Participation is
also implicated in the fabrication of the boundaries of responsibility and
28 GN Mandel, ‘Regulating Emerging Technologies’ (2009) 1 Law, Innovation
and Technology 75. Emphasis added. Cf Brownsword, above, n 5, 124 (who
stresses the importance of approaching and addressing public concerns from
the beginning of the development of nanotechnologies for medical
application).
29 Rose et al. describe this as ‘a way of doing things that . . . [is] oriented to spe-
cific objectives and that . . . [reflects] on itself in characteristic ways’: N Rose,
P O’Malley, and M Valverde, ‘Governmentality’ (2006) 2 Annual Review of
Law and Social Science 83, 84.
30 For discussion, see: R Baldwin, ‘Is Better Regulation Smarter Regulation?’
(2005) Public Law 485; R Devon, ‘Towards a Social Ethics of Technology:
A Research Prospect’ (2004) 8 Techne 99; S Jasanoff, ‘Technologies of Hu-
mility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science’ (2003) 41 Minerva 223;
H Nowotny, ‘How Many Policy Rooms Are There?’ (2007) 32 Science, Tech-
nology & Human Values 479.
31 Brownsword, above, n 5, 128. Further discussion at 120–128 includes: D
Galligan, ‘Citizens’ Rights and Participation in the Regulation of Biotechnol-
ogy’ in F Francioni (ed), Biotechnologies and International Human Rights
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007).
32 R Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Ethical Pluralism, and the Regulation of
Modern Biotechnologies’ in T Murphy (ed), New Technologies and
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009).
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the legitimation of the regulatory process33 and its outcome, i.e. helping
foster confidence in and the consumption of innovation.34
Resonant here is work from critical theory, especially that influenced
by Foucault. A major insight is the importance of power/knowledge.
Knowledge is formulated as encompassing ‘the vast assemblage of
persons, theories, projects, experiments and techniques that has
become such a central component of government’—it is ‘the “know
how” that makes government possible’.35 In its relation to power,
knowledge helps to provide the basis for regulation. This, in turn, is
fused with and ordered by a neoliberal political rationality, which
seeks to make the subjects of regulation ‘complicit’ with it.36 In this
light, citizen participation in nanoregulation for medical application
looks like yet another means of producing docile subjects who actively
regulate themselves.37
It is clear that regulation embeds a range of societal concerns, or-
ganizational aims, and individual aspirations (as both socio-legal
scholars and regulators themselves are of course well aware).
However, the target of regulation—science and technology—can
itself be understood in these terms, as STS has long shown. This dis-
cipline emphasises the importance of investigating the construction,
use, and deployment of scientific facts,38 including how knowledge
33 J Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-Based Regulation and the New Public Risk
Management in the United Kingdom’ (2005) Public Law 512; J Black, ‘Ten-
sions in the Regulatory State’ (2007) Public Law 58.
34 Cf G Bache, ML Flear, and TK Hervey, ‘The Defining Features of the Euro-
pean Union’s Approach to Regulating New Health Technologies’ in ML
Flear, A-M Farrell, TK Hervey, and T Murphy (eds), European Law and
New Health Technologies (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013
(Forthcoming)).
35 N Rose and P Miller, ‘Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Gov-
ernment’ (1992) 43 (2) British Journal of Sociology 172, 178.
36 M Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume One, The Will to Knowledge
(Penguin, London 1998); M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lec-
tures at the Colle`ge de France, 1977–1978 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke
2007); M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Colle`ge de
France, 1978–1979 (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2008). Cf T Lemke,
‘‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Colle`ge de
France on Neo-liberal Governmentality’ (2001) 30 (2) Economy and
Society 190; W Brown, Edgework (Princeton UP, Woodstock 2005), 39–44.
37 D Lupton, Medicine as Culture: Illness, Disease and the Body in Western
Society (Sage, London 1994); BS Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowl-
edge (2nd edn Sage, London 1995).
38 K Knorr Cetina, ‘Laboratory Studies: The Cultural Approach to the Study of
Science’ in S Jasanoff and others (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology
Studies (Sage, London 1995); B Latour, Science in Action. How to Follow
Scientists and Engineers through Society (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA 1987); M Lynch and S Woolgar (eds), Representation in Sci-
entific Practice (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1990); A Pickering (ed), Science
as Practice and Culture (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992).
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is ‘incorporated into practices of state-making, or of governance
more broadly’.39 For STS scholars, what we know, how we know
it, and what we do are always co-produced.
As with knowledge, so too its material embodiments; sociological and
STS research has long shown how technology has a social life of its own.
Society is ‘built into’ artefacts, through ideas concerning how they might
and should be used, and how they are eventually implemented.40 In
some cases, prospective users are literally included in the design
process; in other cases, they are included as imaginaries which reflect
innovators’ own social location.41 At the same time, the material
world (including technoscientific innovation) impacts powerfully on
our experience of our selves and one another; it is constitutive of subject-
ivity and social life.42 Technologies, then, especially those concerned
with health, are ‘political machines’43 which become embroiled with
and further engender biopolitical debates and campaigns.44
STS research on the ways in which users are configured (or not) by
technologies is also germane to recent work within regulatory
studies.45 Within this latter literature, analysts are asking hard questions
about the accountability of technologies which prescribe user
behaviour—and hence shape, constrain, or perhaps even eliminate
human agency.46 Work on ‘design-based regulation’ is (like STS) con-
cerned with what norms, values, virtues, and behavioural options are
‘designed-in’ and ‘designed-out’ of technologies, and how these can
39 S Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-production’ in S Jasanoff (ed), States of Knowl-
edge (Routledge, London 2004) 3.
40 L Winner, ‘Do Artefacts Have Politics?’ (1980) 109 Daedalus 121–136; D
MacKenzie and J Wajcman (eds), The Social Shaping of Technology,
Second Edition (Open University Press, Buckingham 1999).
41 L Neven, ‘“But Obviously It’s Not for Me”: Robots, Laboratories and the
Defiant Identity of Elder Test Esers’ (2010) 32 Sociology of Health &
Illness 335; M Pickersgill, ‘Standardising Antisocial Personality Disorder:
The Social Shaping of a Psychiatric Technology’ (2012) 34 Sociology of
Health & Illness 544; G Walker and others, ‘Renewable Energy and Socio-
technical Change: Imagined Subjectivities of “The Public” and Their Implica-
tions’ (2010) 42 Environment and Planning A 931.
42 T Dant, Materiality and Society (Open University Press, Maidenhead 2005).
43 Cf A Barry, Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society (Athlone
Press, London 2001).
44 N Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the
21st Century (Princeton UP, Oxford 2007).
45 M Akrich, ‘The De-scription of Technical Objects’ in WE Bijker and J Law
(eds), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical
Change (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1992); N Oudshoorn and T Pinch
(eds), How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technologies,
New Edition (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2005); S Woolgar, ‘Configuring
the User: The Case of Usability Trials’ in J Law (ed), A Sociology of Monsters:
Essays on Power, Technology and Domination (Routledge, London 1991).
46 Lessig, above, n 18.
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and commonly do inhibit or prevent action.47 Issues pertaining to over-
sight and legitimacy, and the place of public participation in innovation,
are brought to the fore by Yeung and Dixon-Woods in their examination
of design-based regulation and patient safety: ‘when rules are embedded
in the fabric of design, there is no legal or constitutional obligation on
those who identify and design-in the rules to invite participation from
those likely to be affected, let along take into account other stakeholder
interests’.48 This may ‘obscure normative and programmatic commit-
ments on the part of the designers, allow penetration of commercial
and other interests, reduce professional and public accountability, [ . . . ]
and transfer judgments on the tolerability of risk to unaccountable insti-
tutions for which there is little transparency or public accountability’.49
These comments loop back into STS concerns with participation,
which—as a consequence of its centrality within innovation policy
and practice—has received considerable attention. Many working
within STS view participation as a (potential) means of democratising
science and technology, helping to ensure responsible and responsive in-
novation.50 For instance, participation has been figured as a ‘technology
of humility’ that can be used to identify the normative in the technical
and as such supplement the dominant ‘technologies of hubris’ of risk
regulation.51 These are complex systems and means of producing stabil-
ity and economic optimisation, presented as apolitical with the effect of
concealing their construction and limitations (such as regulatory distor-
tions and failures).
At the same time, STS has been enduringly critical of forms of partici-
pation that seek not to include public perspectives, but rather to induce
trust in science and produce acquiescence. Questions are continuously
asked regarding who shapes the design of participation, why this is,
47 Brownsword, above, n 17; K Yeung, ‘Towards an Understanding of Regula-
tion by Design’ in R Brownsword and K Yeung (eds), Regulating Technolo-
gies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart
Publishing, Oxford 2008).
48 K Yeung and M Dixon-Woods, ‘Design-based Regulation and Patient Safety:
A Regulatory Studies Perspective’ (2010) 71 (3) Social Science & Medicine
613, 617. Emphasis added.
49 Ibid. Emphasis added.
50 K Bickerstaff and others, ‘Locating Scientific Citizenship: The Institutional
Contexts and Cultures of Public Engagement’ (2010) 35 (4) Science, Technol-
ogy & Human Values 474; S Cunningham-Burley, ‘Public Knowledge and
Public Trust’ (2006) 9 Community Genetics 204; R Evans and A Plows, ‘Lis-
tening Without Prejudice? Re-discovering the Value of the Disinterested
Citizen’ (2007) 37 (6) Social Studies of Science 827; M Pickersgill, ‘Research,
Engagement and Public Bioethics: Promoting Socially Robust Science’ (2011)
37 Journal of Medical Ethics 698; T Togers-Hayden, A Mohr, and N
Pidgeon, ‘Introduction: Engaging with Nanotechnologies—Engaging Differ-
ently?’ (2007) 1 (2) NanoEthics 123.
51 Jasanoff, above, n 30.
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how it is achieved, and to what ends. Such interrogation is propelled by
the longstanding concern of STS scholars with policies and practices
that figure citizens as ignorant and in need of education. These plura-
lised and grew in prominence during the 1990s along with widely felt
unease regarding advances in (and the potential applications of)
genetic engineering/modification. Many influential actors regarded this
lack of trust in science as a deficit in knowledge, and various activities
were convened in a range of countries in order to address this through
education. Such endeavours neglected, however, the fact that individuals
know about diverse things in different ways, have a range of expertise,
and are often reflexively aware of limitations to their comprehension
of particular sociotechnical developments and may actively seek to
address these.52 A number of scientists and policy makers have
responded to these critiques from STS, and today exercises that were
once aimed at increasing the public understanding of science are now
more frequently viewed as opportunities to promote public engagement
with science (implying a more ‘two-way’ dialogue). STS scholars have
also come to be increasingly reflective about the ways in which they
themselves may contribute to the more problematic aspects of public
participation they have traditionally outlined, as they are now enrolled
as key actors in the deployment of such participatory technologies.53
Recent STS work on the sociology of expectations and the power of
promissory discourse (e.g. statements and debates about the future
promise of technologies which do not yet exist) also connects to cri-
tiques of (particular modes) of citizen participation.54 Within this
52 A Irwin and M Michael, Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge (Open
University Press, Maidenhead 2003); A Kerr, S Cunningham-Burley, and A
Amos, ‘The New Genetics and Health: Mobilizing Lay Expertise’ (1998) 7
(1) Public Understanding of Science 41; BE Wynne, ‘Knowledges in
Context’ (1991) 16 Science, Technology & Human Values 111; BE
Wynne, ‘Misunderstood Misunderstandings: Social Identities and Public
Uptake of Science’ (1992) 1 Public Understanding of Science 281.
53 P-B Joly and A Kaufman, ‘Lost in Translation? The Need for “Upstream En-
gagement” with Nanotechnology on Trial’ (2008) 17 (3) Science as Culture
225; BE Wynne, ‘Dazzled by the Mirage of Influence? STS-SSK in Multiva-
lent Registers of Relevance’ (2007) 32 (4) Science, Technology & Human
Values 491.
54 M Fortun, Promising Genomics: Iceland and deCODE Genetics in a World
of Speculation (University of California Press, Berkeley 2008); A Hedgecoe
and P Martin, ‘The Drugs Don’t Work: Expectations and the Shaping of
Pharmacogenetics’ (2003) 33 Social Studies of Science 327; M Pickersgill,
‘Connecting Neuroscience and Law: Anticipatory Discourse and the Role
of Sociotechnical Imaginaries’ (2011) 30 (1) New Genetics and Society 27;
M Pickersgill, ‘“Promising” Therapies: Neuroscience, Clinical Practice, and
the Treatment of Psychopathy’ (2011) 33 Sociology of Health & Illness
448; S Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Voca-
tion (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2008); K Sunder Rajan, Biocapi-
tal: The Constitution of Post-Genomic Life (Duke University Press, London
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literature, ideas about the future have been shown to be ‘resources’ that
can be mobilised by credible individuals and organisations in order to
lend further legitimacy to current research practices. Promissory or an-
ticipatory discourses can be regarded as, in a sense, able to ‘bring the
future into the present’; in so doing, it is rendered as a commodity
that can be acted upon in order to literally produce the realities future-
orientated discourse describes while constraining or even eliminating the
conditions of possibility for others. This may involve the galvanisation
of bioethical scholarship to tease out the implications of (prospective)
science for society, and hence to provide a kind of regulatory
roadmap for innovators to follow in order to expedite the realisation
of the futures they have worked so hard to imagine.55 Public participa-
tion is a key site where debate around futures is played out, and the
kinds of futures made discursively available to citizens engaging in par-
ticipatory techniques is thus salient since these can, literally, be talked
into existence.
Thus far, we have drawn on a range of literature from law, regulatory
studies, critical theory, and STS in order to outline some of the political
and regulatory logics underpinning and animating public participation
in science and technology, and sketched out some of the associated cri-
tiques and concerns that have been advanced in regards to participatory
techniques. In what follows, we go on to consider how the EU currently
fosters and regulates innovation and relates this regime to public partici-
pation, before, in turn, examining how that conceptual and normative
backdrop is further refined in the broad structures of nanoregulation,
and how all of that underpins the design of participatory processes.
In tracing the gradual hardening of the conditions of possibility for
technologies of participation, we do not seek to propose a specific
design for them. Rather, underpinned by a concern for democratic
decision-making, we aim to foster a vantage point that seeks to
promote discussion on an important yet overlooked aspect of their
design: critical reflection on the regulation of publics and the limits on
their regulatory potential.
2006); E Thacker, The Global Genome: Biotechnology, Politics and Culture
(MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2005); C Thompson, Making Parents: The
Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies (MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA 2005); C Selin, ‘Expectations and the Emergence of Nano-
technology’ (2007) 32 Science, Technology & Human Values 196; C Selin,
‘The Sociology of the Future: Tracing Stories of Technology and Time’
(2008) 2 Sociology Compass 1878; N Brown, B Rappert, and A Webster
(eds), Contested Futures: A Sociology of Prospective Technoscience
(Ashgate, Aldershot 2000).
55 Hedgecoe and Martin, ibid.
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III. INNOVATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE EU
A. Programmatic Level
In the context of the EU, (nano)regulation fits within, and is under-
pinned at the programmatic level, the overarching steer for EU govern-
ance, by the 2000 European Council Lisbon Strategy.56 Here research
was presented as ‘the driver for the production and exploitation of
knowledge [making it] above all a linchpin in the implementation of
the Lisbon strategy to make Europe the most dynamic and competitive,
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic
growth, employment and social cohesion’.57 EU funding of research and
development was, and continues to be, seen as integral to the creation of
a European Research Area, which aims to ‘reinvigorate research in
Europe’,58 and is linked to the Lisbon Strategy as part the so-called
knowledge triangle of research, education, and innovation.59 Import-
antly, while EU funding is limited by the principle of ‘European
added value’,60 it is directed at enabling discourse between researchers
in different Member States (MSs) in order to foster the economic com-
petitiveness of European industry,61 and integration.62
The Lisbon Strategy was subsequently refocused on growth and jobs,63
and in 2010 this was intensified in light of the recent European financial
crisis in the European Commission (Commission) ‘Europe 2020’ strategy
56 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions—Lisbon European
Council, 23rd and 24th March (Brussels 2000). See: K Armstrong, ‘Govern-
ance and Constitutionalism After Lisbon’ in JCMS Symposium: EU Govern-
ance After Lisbon (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 413.
57 European Commission, Building the ERA of Knowledge for Growth,
COM(2005) 118 final, 2. Emphasis added.
58 European Commission, Towards a European Research Area, COM(2000) 6
final, 5.
59 European Commission, Innovation Tomorrow Innovation Policy and the
Regulatory Framework: Making Innovation an Integral Part of the Broader
Structural Agenda, Prepared by Louis Lengrand and Associe´s, PREST (Uni-
versity of Manchester) and ANRT (France). Innovation papers No. 28.
Directorate-General for Enterprise (Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, Luxembourg 2002); European Commission,
Putting Knowledge into Practice: A Broad-based Innovation Strategy for
the EU, COM(2006) 502 final.
60 Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of
the European Community for research, technological development and dem-
onstration activities (2007–2013) OJ 2006 L 412/1.
61 TK Hervey and JV McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 2004), 243–244.
62 R Gusma‘o, ‘Research Networks as a Means of European Integration’ (2003)
23 Technology in Science 386.
63 W Kok, Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employ-
ment. Report from the High Level Group Chaired by Wim Kok (European
Commission, Brussels 2004).
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for economic growth.64 The focus on optimising the economy by and
through the exploitation of knowledge (such as that produced by nanor-
esearch)65and the propagation of ‘knowledge workers’ is also evident in
the nanotechnology policy domain, where it is linked to EU funding of in-
novation through its Framework Programmes (FP). For instance, in the
seventh FP, FP7,66 even basic research—including on nanotechnology67—
is framed as a driver of growth and understood as signifying a forward
march of progress,68 rather than being regarded as a means of increasing
knowledge and understanding as an end in itself.69
As such, (nano)science and (nano)technology are embedded within a
network that constructs the EU’s identity, and its narrative about itself
(including in terms of what it regulates, how, and why). As we will see,
these both seek to reflect and produce public perceptions of nano-
technologies; such perceptions themselves help to sanction—and thus
play a role in producing—particular futures where in nanoscience and
technology plays a key role.70 In particular, there is an effort to privilege
and support the creation and production of innovative nanoproducts in
order to enhance the internal market,71 and ultimately the wider project
of European integration.
64 See, generally: ,http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. last
accessed 14 March 2012. Also see: European Commission, Smart Regulation
in the European Union, COM (2010) 543 final; European Commission,
Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, COM (2010) 546 final.
65 ‘Commission launches consultation on EU 2020: a new strategy to
make the EU a smarter, greener social market’: ,http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1807..
66 Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 18 December 2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of
the European Community for Research, Technological Development and
Demonstration Activities (2007–2013) OJ 2006 L 412/1.
67 Nanotechnologies are highlighted in the FP7 objectives, in such references as
‘the development and validation of new therapies[ . . . ]diagnostic tools and
medical technologies’. The activities to be funded include ‘[i]nnovative thera-
peutic approaches and intervention’ ie ‘[t]o research, consolidate and ensure
further developments in advanced therapies and technologies with potential
application in many diseases and disorders such as new therapeutic tools for
regenerative medicine’. Importantly, much of the focus of FP7 is on ‘transla-
tional research’ which attempts to translate basic research into usable (or
marketable) technologies. See: Proposed Priorities for Innovative Health
Research 2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/pdf/fp7-health-2012-
orientation-paper_en.pdf (last accessed 1 May 2012)).
68 Cf SHE Harmon, ‘Motivating Values and Regulating Models for Emerging
Technologies: Stem Cell Research Regulation in Argentina and the United
Kingdom’ in M Freeman (ed), Law and Ethics (Oxford University Press,
Oxford 2008), 147.
69 Bache and others, above, n 34.
70 C Tourney, ‘Narratives for Nanotech: Anticipating Public Reactions to
Nanotechnology’ (2004) 8 Techne 88.
71 Defined in Art 26(2) TFEU as, ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured’. The estab-
lishment of the internal market is required by Art 3(3) amended TEU.
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B. Nanoregulation
The overarching concerns found at the programmatic level are reflected
in discourse on (and constitutive of) nanotechnology.72 For instance, in
Towards a European Strategy for Nanotechnology (Nanotechnology
Strategy), the Commission states:
[in] today’s globalised market, long-term economic success is in-
creasingly dependent on the generation, management and exploit-
ation of knowledge. Investment in R&D is needed to produce
knowledge and industrial innovation, [which] in turn, needs knowl-
edge to produce wealth. In this way, the loop is closed and fresh
private capital can be injected into R&D.73
Unlocking ‘the potential of this knowledge’ is also part of the con-
stitution of the EU’s identity in relation to the rest of the world, as it
seeks to project power and generate legitimacy through competitive in-
dustries and the cultivation of ‘new European knowledge-based
industries’.74
Ultimately, European ‘excellence in nanosciences must finally be
translated into commercially viable products and processes’. Nano-
technology is presented as being ‘one of the most promising and
rapidly expanding fields of R&D to provide new impetus towards
the dynamic knowledge-based objectives of the Lisbon process’.75
The focus of EU efforts is then to ‘ensure the creation and exploitation
of the knowledge generated via R&D for the benefit of society’
through a range of actions which include increasing investment in
and coordination of research and development, the construction of
supporting infrastructure, and the advancement of interdisciplinary
education that might result in researchers with, predictably, ‘a
stronger entrepreneurial mindset’, and who will work within a socio-
technical ecosystem that will provide ‘favourable conditions for tech-
nology transfer and innovation’ in order to ‘ensure that European
R&D excellence is translated into wealth-generating products and
processes’.76
72 Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Guidance on Future Prior-
ities for European Research and Research-based Innovation, 2982nd Com-
petitiveness (Internal market, Industry, and Research) Council Meeting,
Brussels, 3 December 2009. Available at: ,http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/111723.pdf. last accessed 1
March 2012.
73 European Commission, above, n 11, 16.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. 3. Emphasis added.
76 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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Notably, and as elaborated below, these rationales are endorsed by
the EU’s harnessing of bioethics. In its Opinion on the Ethical
Aspects of Nanomedicine (Opinion), the European Group on Ethics
in Science and New Technologies (EGE) justifies EU funding and invest-
ment into research and development, and, as we shall see, seeks to
develop nanoregulation through the leveraging of risk and scientific
uncertainty.77 As Harvey and Salter point out, novel science ‘gives bio-
ethical expertise access to new governance territory; bioethical expertise
gives sciences access to political acceptability’.78 Accordingly, we should
not be surprised that the EGE has endorsed risk-orientated regulation
that seeks to foster and direct, rather than circumscribe, innovation in
nanotechnology. Indeed, for biotechnologies in general, the EGE has
been shown to be an important means of providing legitimacy and
garnering support for innovation.79
The EGE’s Opinion is supplemented by the 2007 Code of Conduct for
Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research Consult-
ation Paper (CoC Consultation Paper)80 and 2008 Code of Conduct
for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research (Code
of Conduct).81 In the CoC Consultation Paper, the Commission states
that the resultant code should be ‘a basis for international dialogue in
this area, where Europe has taken a proactive role’.82 Standard legal
foundations83 were combined with principles, norms, and values
77 EGE, above, n 11.
78 A Harvey and B Salter, ‘Anticipatory Governance: Bioethical Expertise for
Human/Animal Chimeras’ (2012) Science as Culture 1. Emphasis added.
79 H Busby, T Hervey, and A Mohr, ‘Ethical EU law? The Influence of the Euro-
pean Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies’ (2008) 33 European
Law Review 803.
80 European Commission, Towards a Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanos-
ciences and Nanotechnologies Research, Consultation Paper, 2007 (available
at: ,http://ec.europa.eu/research/consultations/pdf/nano-consultation_en.pdf.
last accessed 8 March 2012), 3.
81 European Commission, Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and
Nanotechnologies Research, C(2008) 424 final.
82 European Commission, above, n 80, 2.
83 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) (with the im-
plementation of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, Art 6 amended
Treaty on European Union (TEU) gives this the same status as the Treaties)
and the general principles resulting from relevant international treaties such
as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (noted as a source
for the general principles of EU law in Art 6(3) amended TEU, with the
EU’s accession to the Council of Europe being required under Art 6(2)
amended TEU), and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology
and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo
Convention) (1997), and the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (the Aarhus Convention) (1998). See: European Commission,
above, n 80, 2.
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found in policy documents, including the Nanotechnology Strategy and
the EGE’s Opinion,84 which together are taken to be ‘core European
values, such as integrity, autonomy, privacy, equity, fairness,
pluralism and solidarity’.85 Three key principles of ‘precaution, inclu-
siveness, and integrity’86 were highlighted as necessary to structure the
Code of Conduct, with the aim of ensuring that nano-innovation contri-
butes to ‘improving human well-being’ while also guarding against ‘pos-
sible threats to human well-being’.87 These points were largely
duplicated, albeit in a slightly reconfigured and simplified form in the
Code of Conduct as ‘general principles’ (some of which are highlighted
in the next section): meaning (explained as ‘comprehensible to the
public’ and respectful of ‘fundamental rights and be conducted in the
interest of the well-being of individuals and society’88), sustainability,
precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation, and accountability.89
The Code of Conduct is an important technology through which the
EU produces its identity: specifically, it presents EU innovation as ra-
tional and legitimate, while also rendering it more governable (since a
deviation from the code comes with an implicit or explicit threat of sanc-
tion).90 The Code of Conduct is also a means by which the EU produces
and exercises power—and, indeed, further contributes to the fostering of
innovation, since ‘the very process of deliberating about codes’ help to
‘build shared agendas’ and enable ‘future co-ordinated initiatives’.91
At the same time, the kinds of bioethical discourses constitutive of
codes of conduct are ‘capable of legitimizing the regulatory polices ne-
cessary for maintaining public trust’.92 Together, the CoC Consultation
Paper and Code of Conduct underscore our points that regulation in the
EU is designed to foster research, development and economic optimisa-
tion, orientated around risk, and animated through expectations about
positive sociotechnical futures enabled by innovative science and tech-
nology. Overall, this is a means of presenting the EU as a legitimate,
84 Both referencing: European Commission, The Precautionary Principle,
COM(2000) 1.
85 European Commission, above, n 80, 3.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 European Commission, above, n 81, 6.
89 Ibid 6–7.
90 Cf A Abbot, ‘Professional Ethics’ (1983) 88(5) American Journal of Soci-
ology 855.
91 B Rappert, ‘Pacing Science and Technology with Codes of Conduct: Rethink-
ing What Works’ in GE Marchant, BR Allenby, and JR Herkert (eds), The
Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight:
The Pacing Problem (Springer, Dordrecht 2011), 110.
92 B Salter and C Salter, ‘Bioethics and the Global Moral Economy: The Cul-
tural Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science’ (2007) 32 (5)
Science, Technology & Human Values 554.
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accountable body that is an international leader in socially robust innov-
ation. Yet, as we go on to explain this attempt at producing legitimacy is
undermined by the design of publics in nanoregulation.
C. Participation in Science and Technology
While the importance of ensuring the ‘creation and exploitation of the
knowledge generated via R&D for the benefit of society’93 is noted by
the Commission, those benefits are largely undefined. Given the predom-
inant focus of the EU on economic optimisation, it is plausible that soci-
etal benefit is seen largely to emerge from this (if it is not directly reduced
to it). Participation is tacked onto these actions through rather imprecise
language that highlights the need to ‘integrate societal considerations into
the R&D process at an early stage’.94 However, exactly why this should
be is commonly unspecified. Furthermore, if participation may be deemed
to have the potential to decelerate innovation, it would—under the nor-
mative regime the EU has built for itself—be more sensible to minimise
the scope and impact of participatory techniques. It is with this in mind
that social scientists noted in Taking European Knowledge Society Ser-
iously that any ‘loss of potential economic competitiveness is invoked
as almost a ‘state of emergency’, such that efficiency overrides the
slower and more cumbersome application of democratic principles’.95
The EU, then, has not formally institutionalised participation in or
around the assemblage of actors and organisations regulating and con-
stituting techno- and especially nano-science in Europe. While a range
of initiatives such as citizen panels exist, the EU’s more general weak
legal commitment to participation is mirrored in its approach to nanor-
egulation and innovation. The weak legal foundations are found in, for
example, the EU’s Treaties96 and, importantly in the nanotechnology
sphere, one of the standard legal foundations for the Code of Conduct
‘general principles’ noted above, the Aarhus Convention (1998).
93 European Commission, above, n 11, 3. Emphasis added.
94 Ibid. Emphasis added.
95 Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously: Report of the Expert Group
on Science and Governance (Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg 2007), 52.
96 For instance, Art 2 TEU (the EU is ‘founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect
for human rights’ (emphasis added)), Art 10(3) TEU (‘[e]very citizen shall
have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions
shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen’ (emphasis
added)), and Art 11(1) TEU (‘[t]he institutions shall, by appropriate means,
give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make
known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action’ (em-
phasis added)). See further: ML Flear and A Vakulenko, ‘A Human Rights
Perspective on Citizen Participation in the EU’s Governance of New Tech-
nologies’ (2010) 10 (4) Human Rights Law Review 661.
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Although potentially important for the general field, this instrument
focuses on supporting participation to address just environmental
impacts and as such seems rather limited in relation to medical
applications as it fails to address the full range of concerns they might
raise.97 Unsurprisingly then, participation is constructed more through
(legally) non-binding policy statements.98 These include European
Governance,99 which called for openness, transparency and enhanced
public participation throughout the process of science-based decision
making,100 in order to reinforce accountability, and engender (or
restore) public trust and legitimacy. This is especially orientated
towards areas of risk and scientific uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies.
Yet, even as participation has an underspecified regulatory role, the focus
on innovation and the installation of a neoliberal orientation in EU regu-
lation limits and implicitly steers the use of participation towards promot-
ing rather than challenging or shaping scientific and technological
research trajectories.101
Another key document, Science and Society Action Plan,102 contains
similar themes to those apparent within European Governance and
other documents.103 Supported by Public Understanding of Science
97 See above, n 83. For discussion, see: J D’Silva and G van Calster, ‘For Me to
Know and You to Find Out? Participatory Mechanisms, The Aarhus Conven-
tion and New Technologies’ (2010) 4 (2) Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technol-
ogy Art 3. See further: ,http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/index.htm..
98 For discussion, see: Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, above,
n 95, 52.
99 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM(2001)
428 final. For commentary, see: K Armstrong, ‘Rediscovering Civil Society:
The European Union and the White Paper on Governance’ (2002) 8 Euro-
pean Law Journal 102. For an overview of initiatives, see: European Commis-
sion, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on European
Governance (2003–2004), SEC(2004) 1153. In the health sphere, one
focus of new technologies, see European Commission, White Paper, Together
for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008–2013, COM(2007) 630
final; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Accom-
panying White Paper, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU
2008–2013, SEC(2007) 1376.
100 European Commission, European Governance, ibid, 8.
101 Flear and Vakulenko, above, n 96.
102 European Commission, Science and Society Action Plan, COM(2001) 714.
See also: European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Science,
Society and the Citizen in Europe, SEC(2000) 1973; European Commission,
Science and Technology, the Key to Europe’s Future: Guidelines for Future
European Union Policy to Support Research, COM(2004) 353 final.
103 For example: European Commission, Life Sciences and Biotechnology: A
Strategy for Europe, COM(2002) 27 final; European Commission, Promot-
ing the Competitive Environment for the Industrial Activities Based on Bio-
technology within the Community, SEC(91) 629 final. See also: European
Commission, Working Together for Growth and Jobs. A New Start for
the Lisbon Strategy, COM(2005) 24 final.
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(PUS) techniques that actively seek to measure public opinion and
knowledge, such as the Eurobarometer,104 the focus is on the promotion
of scientific education and culture, public awareness, science education,
and the development of responsible polices that win wider confidence;
for instance, through ‘a structured dialogue’ between scientists, indus-
try, and civil society and the establishment of a Commission-led Stake-
holders’ Forum. Yet, at the same time, public involvement continues to
be figured in terms of a ‘deficit model’ within which participation is a
means of (much needed) education for citizens who are seen as deficient
in their knowledge about science.105 Such education may also more
widely involve various other actors and institutions, such as media,
researchers, universities, and industry. Overall, in general technologies
of participation in the EU have tended to be used more to legitimate
regulation, than ensure the (substantive) involvement of citizens in regu-
latory and priority setting in innovation.106
Having considered the general conceptual and normative backdrop
for EU nanoregulation and its relationship to participation, in the
next section we proceed to highlight the norms, values, and sociotechni-
cal imaginaries immanent to the discourses. In doing so we ask whether
the publics constructed are regulatory or regulated. We work in broad
brush strokes rather than close detail in order to highlight examples
that are indicative of the broader picture, focusing in particular on docu-
ments making forward-looking statements (especially the Nanotechnol-
ogy Strategy107) and those considering codes of conduct.108
IV. THE PUBLIC IN EU NANOREGULATION
A. Anticipating (Certain) Nano-futures
It is, we believe, fair to say that expectations about the future are of
paramount importance when considering the approach of the EU
104 European Commission, Europeans, Science and Technology, Special
Eurobarometer 154, December 2001; European Commission, Social Values,
Science and Technology, Special Eurobarometer 225, June 2005 ,http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf. last
accessed 2 May 2012.
105 Flear and Vakulenko, above, n 96.
106 Ibid.
107 European Commission, above, n 11; see also: European Commission,
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: an Action Plan for Europe 2005–
2009, COM(2005) 243; European Commission, Nanosciences and Nano-
technologies: An Action Plan for Europe 2005–2009. First Implementation
Report 2005–2007, COM(2007) 505 final; European Commission, Nanos-
ciences and Nanotechnologies: An Action Plan for Europe 2005–2009.
Second Implementation Report 2007–2009, COM(2009)607 final.
108 Mainly available at ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/policy/
index_en.htm..
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towards nanotechnology, including its medical applications. Indeed, in
the Nanotechnology Strategy, nanotechnology is noted as ‘“ horizon-
tal”, “ key” or “enabling” since it can pervade virtually all technological
sectors...and is expected to lead to innovations that can contribute
towards addressing many of the problems facing today’s society’.109
Medical applications, noted earlier, are also regarded by the EU as
one promising problem area, and are seen as including:
miniaturised diagnostics that could be implanted for early diagnosis
of illness. Nanotechnology-based coatings can improve the bio-
activity and biocompatibility of implants. Self-organising scaffolds
pave the way for new generations of tissue engineering and biomim-
etic materials, with the long-term potential of synthesising organ
replacements. Novel systems for targeted drug delivery are under
development and recently nanoparticles could be channelled into
tumour cells in order to treat them, e.g. through heating.110
In light of such expectations, the integration of ‘societal considerations
into the R&D process at an early stage’111 is one action for policy. As
such, apparently in an effort to convince scientific experts and regula-
tors, it is ‘in the common interest to adopt a proactive stance and
fully integrate societal considerations into the R&D process, exploring
its benefits, risks and deeper implications for society’. Regulatory
publics are seemingly encouraged—especially since this process ‘needs
to be carried out as early as possible’.112 This is echoed by the EGE,
which configures participation in relation to risk as ‘societal dialogue’
and notes the need for participation ‘public concerns are approached
and discussed from the beginning’.113 Moreover, in the Code of
Conduct, the general principle of ‘inclusiveness’ means that ‘research ac-
tivities should be guided by the principles of openness to all stake-
holders, transparency and respect for the legitimate right of access to
information. It should allow the participation in decision-making pro-
cesses of all stakeholders involved in or concerned’.114
However, ‘the complex and invisible nature of nanotechnology pre-
sents a challenge for science and risk communicators’.115 In other
words, as elaborated below, publics need to be educated if they are to
be enrolled in regulation. This is to be achieved, in part, by ‘governing
109 European Commission, above, n 11, 4. Emphasis added.
110 Ibid. Emphasis added.
111 European Commission, above, n 11, 3. Emphasis added.
112 European Commission, above, n 11, 19. Emphasis added.
113 EGE, above, n 11, para 4.4.4.2. Emphasis added.
114 European Commission, above, n 81, 6. Emphasis added.
115 European Commission, above, n 11, 19. Emphasis added.
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anticipation’, which indicates participation is a technology for the regu-
lation of public expectations even as hopes and benefits are articulated:
Without a serious communication effort, nanotechnology innova-
tions could face an unjust negative public reception. An effective
two-way dialogue is indispensable, whereby the general publics’
views are taken into account and may be seen to influence decisions
concerning R&D policy. The public trust and acceptance of nano-
technology will be crucial for its long-term development and allow
us to profit from its potential benefits. It is evident that the scientific
community will have to improve its communication skills.116
Of course, this implies a role for regulatory publics through dialogue
about nanotechnology development. As Borup and colleagues point
out, expectations are ‘first and foremost “constitutive” or “performa-
tive” in attracting the interest of necessary allies (various actors in innov-
ation networks, investors, regulatory actors, users and so on)’.117
Unsurprisingly then, the expectations associated with nanotechnology
propel investment in this area, with public (and even private) funding
endorsed by the EGE.118 Perhaps, especially in regards to medical appli-
cations, there is also, as Doubleday notes, a concomitant expansion in
social and ethical engagement and debate.119 In particular, nanoregula-
tion brings to the fore different and contested ideas of not just the tech-
nology to be brought into being and regulated, but also how it will fit
into society, and how different notions of human dignity and morality
will be defined, perpetuated, and perhaps reshaped.120
At the same time, however, visions of the medical and economic
import of the technology regulate publics through defining what is ‘at
stake’, and by implication the citizens included as stakeholders121 in
116 Ibid, 20. Emphasis added.
117 M Borup and others, ‘The Sociology of Expectations in Science and Tech-
nology’ (2006) 18 Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 285,
289. Emphasis added.
118 EGE, above, n 11, paras 4.4.4.2 and 4.4.4.3, and Appendix 1.
119 R Doubleday, ‘Risk, Public Engagement and Reflexivity: Alternative Fram-
ings of the Public Dimensions of Nanotechnology’ (2007) 9 (2) Health, Risk
& Society 211; R Doubleday, ‘Organizing Accountability: Co-production of
Technoscientific and Social Worlds in a Nanoscience Laboratory’ (2007) 39
(2) Area 166.
120 Cf R Brownsword, ‘What the World Needs Now: Techno-regulation, Hu-
manity, Human Rights and Human Dignity’ in R Brownsword (ed),
Global Governance and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2004).
121 For the EU, stakeholders here are—in theory—extremely broad, included
‘Member States, employers, research funders, researchers, and more gener-
ally all individuals and civil society organisations engaged, involved or
interested in N&N [nanoscience and nanotechnology] research’ (European
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participatory techniques. For instance, the focus on hope, benefit, and
similar expectations might support and privilege—or, in other words,
design-in—the articulation of human rights and utilitarian-based
ethics, respectively,122 while limiting the discursive space for—and im-
plying the design-out of—a dignitarian ethic. In any case, the limited
discursive space undermines procedural epistemic integration of more
pessimistic or, perhaps more accurately, contrary voices in participatory
techniques. As a consequence, such voices might be constrained, or even
squeezed out and silenced.123 In short, the focus on hope and other posi-
tive expectations enrols, and prioritises the inclusion of and the voicing
of claims by, those individuals and groups who actively campaign
towards, for example, public funding or research that addresses their
concerns and supports the development of nano-enabled ‘hope tech-
nologies’.124 Recognised in diverse studies from various disciplines,
such individuals and groups include those whose biology or medical
status125 renders them particularly interested in innovation for the treat-
ment of their conditions.126
In relation to ‘accountability’, the Code of Conduct states ‘[r]esearch-
ers and research organisations should remain accountable for the social,
environmental and human health impacts that their N&N [nanoscience
and nanotechnology] research may impose on present and future
Commission, above, n 81, 6). Yet, in practice, only certain citizens can be
included in public participation.
122 M Horst, ‘Public Expectations of Gene Therapy: Scientific Futures and Their
Performative Effects on Scientific Citizenship’ (2007) 32 Science, Technol-
ogy & Human Values 150; C Novas, ‘The Political Economy of Hope:
Patients’ Organizations, Science and Biovalue’ (2006) 1 BioSocieties 289.
123 Cf B Anderson, ‘Hope for Nanotechnology: Anticipatory Knowledge and
the Governance of Affect’ (2007) 39 (2) Area 156, 157. Emphasis added.
124 A term developed in relation to assisted reproductive therapies: S Franklin,
Embodied Progress: A Cultural Account of Assisted Conception (Routledge,
London 1997). For a more general discussion of new technologies, hope and
law, see: M-A Jacob and B Prainsack, ‘Embryonic Hopes: Controversy, Al-
liance, and Reproductive Entities in Law and the Social Sciences’ (2010) 19
(4) Social & Legal Studies 497, a debate and dialogue, and especially: M Fox
and T Murphy ‘Can Law Facilitate Embryonic Hopes?’.
125 J Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body
(Routledge, New York 1991).
126 Such as: ‘moral pioneers’ in R Rapp, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: The
Social Impact of Amniocentesis in America (Routledge, London 2000);
‘genetic citizens’ in D Heath, R Rapp, and K-S Taussig, ‘Genetic Citizenship’
in D Night and J Vincent (eds), A Companion to the Anthropology of Pol-
itics (Blackwell, Oxford 2004); ‘biological citizens’ in N Rose and C Novas,
‘Biological Citizenship’ in A Ong and S Collier (eds), Global Assemblages:
Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Blackwell,
Oxford 2005), Cf J Biehl, Will to Live: AIDS Therapies and the Politics
of Survival (Princeton UP, Princeton 2007). Also see: A Panofsky, ‘Generat-
ing Sociability to Drive Science: Patient Advocacy Organizations and Genet-
ics Research’ (2011) 41 Social Studies of Science 31.
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generations’.127 Moreover, Borup and colleagues note how promissory
discourses are implicated ‘in defining roles and in building mutually
binding obligations and agendas’.128 That is, participation as part of
hopeful scientific citizenship is also a technique of responsibilisation
(i.e. a means of making citizens feel responsible) that helps further regu-
late publics and mediate and limit EU accountability.129 Even as some
non-expert stakeholders’ voices are privileged, they are implicated in
taking (part of) the blame in the event of failure, if and when some
hopes are dashed and some fears are realised.130 This helps to limit
and legitimate regulatory objectives and options, and maintain legitim-
acy in the event of failure.131
B. Engaging with Risk
Anticipation and expectation are central to, and indeed constitutive of,
nanoscience and technology.132 Yet, the risk profile of nanotechnology
is likewise salient, and, as noted above, key to how it is regulated.
Indeed, risk is central in the leveraging of uncertainty to support nanor-
egulation,133 bringing nanotechnological futures into the present,134
and further configuring the conditions of possibility for participation.135
127 European Commission, above, n 81, 6–7. Emphasis added.
128 M Borup and others, ‘The Sociology of Expectations in Science and Tech-
nology’ (2006) 18 Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 285,
289. Emphasis added.
129 Doubleday, above, n 119.
130 D Barney, ‘The Morning After: Citizen Engagement in Technological
Society’ (2006) 9 Techne 23; H Nowotny, ‘Wish Fulfilment and its Discon-
tents’ (2003) 4 EMBO Reports 917; R Tutton, ‘Promising Pessimism:
Reading the Futures to be Avoided in Biotech’ (2011) 41 (3) Social Studies
in Science 411. Cf T Murphy, ‘Technology, Tools and Toxic Expectations:
Post-Publication Notes on New Technologies and Human Rights’ (2009) 2
Law, Innovation and Technology 181.
131 Horst, above, n 122; M Elam and M Bertilsson, ‘Consuming, Engaging and
Confronting Science: The Emerging Dimensions of Scientific Citizenship’
(2007) 6 European Journal of Social Theory 233.
132 Anderson, above, n 123.
133 ‘Risk assessment and dialogue at the EU level’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/
dialogue_collaboration/system/index_en.htm.. On EU risk regulation in
general see: L Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007); V Heyvaert, ‘Governing Climate Change.
Towards a New Paradigm for Risk Regulation’ (2011) 74 (6) Modern
Law Review 817; M Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk
Regulation’ in C O’Cinneide (ed), Current Legal Problems 2009 (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2010).
134 ‘Assessing safety’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/
assessing_safety/index_en.htm..
135 ‘Stakeholders and citizens’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/
citizens_view/index_en.htm..
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The ‘awareness’ of the ‘general public’ about nanotechnology is identi-
fied as growing, regarded as evidenced through requests for information
and the raising of safety concerns.136
While much discourse around nanotechnology is promissory, this also
includes negative expectations such as anxiety about sociotechnical
change and fears about safety.137 It is this, then, which provides a
basis for public engagement in risk regulation. For instance, as is
asserted in the CoC Consultation Paper:
Good governance of nanosciences and nanotechnologies implies an
open and transparent public dialogue addressing possible risks and
realistic expectations. The Code of Conduct could address the re-
quirement of explicit consideration of the limits of knowledge
and control over the development of the technology. It could also
highlight the need to avoid economic risk and inappropriate
public investments in nanotechnology.138
Furthermore, as noted in the Nanotechnology Strategy:
Some people criticise the scientific community for being too far
removed from the mechanisms of democracy with a lack of
public understanding, public perception of risks versus benefits,
and public participation and possibility of control. While the
potential applications of nanotechnology can improve our
quality of life, there may be some risk associated with it, as
with any new technology—this should be openly acknowledged
and investigated. At the same time the public’s perception of
nanotechnology and its risks should be properly assessed and
addressed.139
Accordingly, the Nanotechnology Strategy notes that nanotechnology
‘must be developed in a safe and responsible manner. Ethical princi-
ples must be adhered to and potential health, safety or environmental
risks scientifically studied, also in order to prepare for possible
regulation’.140
136 Above, n 104: ,http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/
ebs_225_report_en.pdf. last accessed 15 March 2012.
137 J Balbus and others, ‘Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time’ in G
Hunt and M Mehta (eds), Nanotechnology: Risk, Ethics and Law (Earth-
scan, London 2006); R Clift, ‘Risk Management and Regulation in an Emer-
ging Technology’ in G Hunt and M Mehta (eds), Nanotechnology: Risk,
Ethics and Law (Earthscan, London 2006).
138 European Commission, above, n 80, 4. Emphasis added.
139 European Commission, above, n 11, 19. Emphasis added.
140 Ibid, 3. Emphasis added.
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Within this discursive arena, public engagement can be read as a
means of risk communication,141 resonant with the call to ‘govern
anticipation’ noted above. The overriding focus on safety is reinforced
by the EGE, which outlines other ethical questions pertaining to
nanotechnology,142 and asks: ‘how do we check that, because of their
greater capacity to pass through biological systems . . . nanodevices
designed for drug delivery would not induce negative side-effects for
patients[?]’.143 Overall, then, the focus is on a technical model of risk,
including a narrow range of matters ‘at risk’, such as ‘health and envir-
onmental risks’.144 This ensures the privileging of expert interpretation
of scientific data and their provision of ‘risk knowledge’, which regulates
publics as it implicitly reduces—and designs-out—the importance of
their (non-expert) participation. Revealingly, risk, instantiated as
safety, is the prime concern for dialogue prefigured by ‘information
sharing’,145 and directed at ‘success’.146
Precaution might provide additional space for participation and
regulatory publics through explicit reference to societal concerns and
norms.147 As noted above, precaution is mentioned in (for example)
the Code of Conduct as a key general principle, and again in the
Nanotechnology Strategy: ‘The Precautionary Principle, as used up
to now, could be applied in the event that realistic and serious
risks are identified’.148 Similarly, the EGE notes ‘uncertainties and
knowledge gaps associated with new nanotechnology-based diagnos-
tics, therapies and preventive measures should be identified. These un-
certainties need to be characterized and measures have to be
developed in order to reduce them as far as possible’.149 However,
in both of these examples, precaution is marginalised to risk manage-
ment. In effect, there is, as Brownsword puts it, ‘no risk to
141 N Pidgeon and T Rogers-Hayden, ‘Opening Up Nanotechnology Dialogue
with the Publics: Risk Communication of ‘Upstream Engagement’?’
(2007) 9 (2) Health, Risk & Society 191.
142 Including those pertaining to human rights, justice and solidarity, the envir-
onment, and . . . . See: EGE, above, n 11, para 4.3.
143 EGE, above, n 11, para 4.21, especially 38.
144 European Commission, above, n 11, 21.
145 ‘Information sharing and dialogue’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/
nanotechnology/citizens_view/index_en.htm..
146 ‘Nano safety for success dialogue’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/
nanotechnology/citizens_view/index_en.htm.; ‘Past events’: ,http://ec.
europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/events/index_en.htm..
147 In that ‘the determination of a tolerable risk level generally requires the in-
volvement of the public in one way or another’ in L Boisson de Chazournes,
‘New Technologies, the Precautionary Principle, and Public Participation’ in
T Murphy (ed), New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2009), 179.
148 European Commission, above, n 11, 20. Emphasis added.
149 EGE, above, n 11, para 5.4.
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manage’.150 This has the effect of further limiting the potential for
regulatory publics, in that publics themselves are regulated by virtue
of the narrowness of discursive space within which they could feasibly
operate. This presumably reinforces the bias, noted above, towards in-
clusion and voicing of certain ethical stances (over and above others).
Indeed, as Brownsword remarks, once a ‘technology has been pro-
nounced safe, or at any rate not demonstrably unsafe, the weight of
“expert” scientific opinion makes it difficult for dissenting voices to
be heard’.151 The increasingly limited scope for participation, in
spite of calls to integrate ‘the societal dimension’152 in risk regulation
and an ‘inclusive approach’153 to responsible research, works to re-
inforce the boundaries of responsibility and accountability: citizen
participation in the regulation of risk can thus be regarded as an
attempt to produce shared responsibility in the event of failure.154
C. ‘Engagement’ as ‘Education’
These concerns are followed by an apparent extension of risk to encom-
pass broader yet still underspecified ‘[s]ocietal impacts’ that ‘need to be
examined and taken into account. Dialogue with the public is essential
to focus attention on issues of real concern rather than “science fiction”
scenarios’.155 This contains a model of EU citizens that imagines them
to lack knowledge and be readily distracted by ‘science fiction’ rather
than ‘real’ issues. Thus, the Nanotechnology Strategy implies a need
for public engagement with science in order to focus on regulating soci-
etal anxiety and fear, and working with the wider foreclosure of what is
‘at stake’ and who is regulated into participation. This works to narrow
the scope of debate: issues that are not ‘of real concern’ can thus be
designed-out of potential technologies of participation. Nanotechnol-
ogy innovators (i.e. those scientists and engineers seeking to develop
nanoscience and nanotechnology in university and commercial settings)
are presumably to be called on within this framework to innovate the
shape of public discourse through the separation of the science from
the ‘science fiction’.
150 Brownsword, above, n 5, 119.
151 Brownsword, above, n 5, 119. Emphasis added.
152 European Commission, above, n 11, 19–21.
153 European Commission, above, n 81, 8.
154 O Lieven and S Maasen, ‘Transdisciplinary Research: Heralding a New
Dawn between Science and Society’ (2007) 16 GAIA Ecological Perspectives
for Science and Society 35; G Abels, ‘Citizen Involvement in Public Policy
Making: Does it Improve Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability?’
(2007) 13 Interdisciplinary Information Sciences 103.
155 European Commission, above, n 11, 3. Emphasis added.
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The logics at work here are likewise reflected in the assertion that
though the ‘Commission is working hard to ensure that nanoscience
and nanotechnologies can bring their benefits to the market while con-
trolling their potential risks’. This requires ‘significant efforts to stimu-
late information sharing and dialogue among stakeholders to build trust
in these technologies’.156 Such comments construct and regulate a rather
passive public, designed merely to bring about the dissolution of public
concern and the support of pro-innovation regulation.157 In this light,
participation can be seen as feeding directly into ‘Europe 2020’ goals
by implicitly promoting the (future) consumption of nano-enabled pro-
ducts and services. In turn, public participation can be read as inter alia
a technology to build trust in an uncertain domain of innovation.
Thus, in spite of references to ‘dialogue’ within EU documents on
nanotechnology, this seems to mean a distinctly ‘one way’ communica-
tion of benefit in which public safety concerns are addressed. Arguably,
publics need certain information and a level of understanding of the
science before an enhanced contribution to regulation and research
priority-setting can take place. However, a focus on ignorance and a
need for education is problematic. It is supported by PUS initiatives
(e.g. the Eurobarometer158) to justify and measure the success of
broad educational projects. These techniques also support the notion
that publics are in some way being involved in decisions from which
they are physically absent. The questions asked are stimulated by antici-
patory and promissory discourses, and the fact that responses are given
serves to validate these expectations further—reinforcing the need for
regulation. However, any ‘deficits’ in knowledge that the Eurobarom-
eter indicate might also be regarded by some as evidence that more edu-
cation is required. This might justify a pedagogical element within
participatory techniques, further disempowering non-scientists and
lending more credibility to expert opinion. From this perspective, tech-
nologies of participation can, paradoxically, be understood as deploy-
able as a means of decreasing the (substantive) involvement of citizens
in regulatory and priority-setting in innovation.159
The current EU model of participation not only potentially underes-
timates the knowledge of (nano)science and technology that citizens
may have, but also reaffirms the technocratic rationalities that exclude
them: if publics need to have some kind of expertise in order to be
156 ‘Stakeholders and citizens’: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/
citizens_view/index_en.htm.. Original emphasis.
157 More broadly see: ,http://ec.europa.eu/health/dialogue_collaboration/
system/index_en.htm..
158 Above, n 104.
159 Cf Brownsword, above, n 5, 126–30.
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included in deliberation about regulation, some might ask, why not
simply limit involvement to credentialed experts in the first place? Part
of the explanation is, as suggested above, to do with sharing responsibility
and diluting EU accountability. Accordingly, this focus on participation-
as-education could be regarded as a counter-democratic move that builds
in future obsolescence into the technologies that are produced to elicit and
include public perspectives. In other words, the discourses that privilege
experts in nanoregulation and power technologies of participation, and
which actively seek to reconstitute citizens as such (i.e. to make them
expert in some way), eventually renders the technologies themselves re-
dundant (since, if successful, everybody becomes an expert—there is
thus no need to consult educated publics since those already working in
the nanotechnology field can be taken as having the requisite expertise
to help shape regulation).
V. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have considered the role of public participation in EU
regulation of nanotechnology through a novel lens synthesised through
insights emerging from law, regulatory studies, critical theory, and STS.
Specifically, we have sought to understand participation as a form of
technology, and then to highlight both what it does, and some of the
norms and values designed into participatory techniques. In so doing,
we have sought to cast new light on the ways in which citizens regulate
science, and the ways in which they themselves are regulated in the
process.
What, then, do technologies of participation do? As should be clear
by now, in strict terms of nanoregulation: very little. The EU widely
discusses citizen participation in the regulation and governance of
technoscientific innovation and implementation, but this is not legally
institutionalised. As such participation is a de facto rather than de
jure form of governance: it comprises diverse techniques and practices,
mandated by policy (i.e. formally non-binding) discourses that are often
produced by associated bodies concerned with the implications of tech-
nologies (such as the EGE). However, in the case of nanotechnology at
least, the actual regulatory power of citizen involvement seems limited.
This is surprising given how the wider societal benefits of nanotechno-
logical applications, such as emerging health and medical technologies,
are ‘talked up’ as part of the reason for the EU’s focus on nanoscience
and technology in general and, in relation to that, the figuration of its
citizenry. Of course, measuring the impact of participation is an empir-
ical question of the kind which is outside the scope of the more
normative analysis this paper has sought to advance. Yet, if citizen
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participation is a relatively under-utilised and under-powered technol-
ogy of regulation, what, then is its actual function?
A key role of technologies of participation is to further empower
drives to innovate. This is achieved through the instantiation of expecta-
tions about the potential of nanotechnology to improve health and
wellbeing through applications like emerging health technologies, and
within sites, spaces, and fora that can amplify and embed this anticipa-
tory discourse within diverse cultural products (e.g. television shows,
radio programmes, film, novels, and newspaper articles). These expecta-
tions in turn justify participation (completing the circuit), especially in
instances where actual or imagined risks are articulated. In this light,
the role of citizen participation in regulation can be seen largely as a
means of legitimating (and perhaps even stimulating) innovation
through engagement with risk, uncertainty, and promise, and mediating
accountability through shared responsibility.
Scientists and engineers are key cogs that turn the wheels of participa-
tory technologies. Their involvement and expertise in nanotechnology
implicitly configures ‘lay’ publics as inexpert, and thus in need of re-
assuring via education. Such education speaks to modernist values on
the import of empirically derived knowledge and the salience of techno-
logical ‘fixes’ for societal ‘problems’.160 Innovation thus becomes
re-problematised; ‘should’ and ‘how’ questions in nanotechnology as a
general field come to combined and specified as: how should the
science be regulated in order to foster innovation and enhance health,
wellbeing, and the economy?
Employing participatory technologies as a means of manufacturing
support for innovation aligns regulatory strategies with published EU
goals to advance science and produce a knowledge economy built on in-
novation. In turn, this is an important means through which the hetero-
geneous assemblage of institutions, agencies, and MSs that constitute
‘the’ EU produce an identity that represents this as a singular body
with aims and the capacity to actualise these (and thus as a powerful
and competitive global actor). A focus on innovation for health
further legitimates both the EU and those seeking to innovate. It is pre-
cisely because these values and sociotechnical imaginaries are ‘built
into’ the policies and practices underpinning and structuring technolo-
gies of participation that they function in the way they do.
In sum, then, the EU actively shapes technologies of participation
(and hence what they can do) through discourses of risk regulation
and bioethics, which are aimed at leveraging uncertainty in scientific
160 R Brownsword and K Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures,
Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing, Oxford
2008).
Med. L. Rev. Regulatory or regulating publics? 69
knowledge and bringing the future into the present. Supporting this are
particular configurations of science/citizen relations (including PUS).
Together, these might serve to simultaneously mobilise, prioritise, and
include certain hopeful and optimistic, and therefore narrow, publics,
that are likely to be underpinned by, and which articulate through,
human rights and utilitarian-based ethics. Conversely, the discourses
shaping participation might also serve to marginalise and even
exclude more pessimistic publics. That is, those individuals and
groups that are likely to be underpinned by, and which articulate
through, a dignitarian ethic. This renders resort to proceduralism as a
means of producing legitimate regulatory decisions in pluralist societies
(such as the EU) even more problematic, in that the discourses shaping
the conditions of possibility for participation differently empower the
perspectives comprising the ‘bioethical triangle’. This raises the ques-
tion: how can legitimate, inclusive, and fair decisions be produced
when all voices are implicitly not included, or are marginalised, and
remain unheard, because they are in effect designed-out?
Of course, in raising this question and making our broader claims, we
do not deny that there may be significant democratic benefits to citizen
participation. Rather, it is precisely because of this that we feel it neces-
sary to explore how and why limitations exist. Further, we refuse an
account of participatory techniques that figures the citizens that work
within them as both lacking in agency and fully configured through
the technocratic norms and values that are built into participatory tech-
niques. Indeed, to do so would be to deploy a similar kind of ‘deficit
model’ of citizen engagement to the one that we have been concerned
to critique. Thus, our goal here is to suggest that it is the norms,
values, and imaginaries constitutive of a genuinely democratic EU,
and a body politic comprised of reflexive agents, that need to be more
carefully designed and built into technologies of participation. This is
antagonistic to current means of inserting publics within restrictive
regimes that close down opportunities for dialogue and debate, or
which frame these so precisely and narrowly that ‘public participation’
is less about producing regulatory publics, than publics that are regu-
lated into providing ‘public legitimation’.
70 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW [2013]
